Europe's Russia Policy Has a Representation Problem. What Is Kaja Kallas For?

The direct conversation between Finland's Alexander Stubb, Norway's Jonas Gahr Støre and Vladimir Putin has exposed a difficult question for the European Union: who has the authority, credibility and political room to negotiate with Moscow?

The telephone conversation between Russian President Vladimir Putin, Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre on 27 October has reopened a debate that European governments have struggled to resolve since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The leaders reportedly spoke for approximately 90 minutes, with the Nordic representatives seeking to communicate concerns about the war and the diplomatic process. The call came as discussions continued about future negotiations involving Russia, Ukraine and the United States. It also exposed divisions among European governments over whether direct engagement with Putin should resume, who should conduct it and what such engagement could achieve. Denmark and Sweden expressed concerns about the lack of coordination, while the leaders involved defended the initiative as a practical diplomatic step.

The question raised by the episode is uncomfortable for the European Union's foreign policy leadership. If individual European leaders can establish direct communication with Moscow, why has the EU struggled to develop a coherent diplomatic channel of its own? Kaja Kallas, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has consistently supported maintaining pressure on Russia and has warned against engagement that could weaken European unity or reward Moscow without meaningful concessions. Her position reflects a legitimate concern: Russia could use diplomatic contact to divide European governments, weaken support for Ukraine or obtain political recognition without changing its conduct. But the opposite risk also exists. A policy that treats direct communication as inherently unacceptable can leave Europe dependent on the United States or individual national leaders to shape negotiations that will have enormous consequences for European security.

The difficulty is partly institutional. Kallas is not the foreign minister of a sovereign European state with independent authority over every member country's foreign policy. She represents the EU within the responsibilities assigned to her office, but major foreign policy decisions remain heavily dependent on agreement among member states. Finland and Norway are also not interchangeable in this structure. Finland is an EU member, while Norway is not. Their leaders can conduct national diplomacy, but they cannot automatically speak on behalf of all European governments. The disagreement over whether the call was adequately coordinated illustrates the problem: Europe wants to act as a geopolitical power, but its foreign policy machinery often requires political agreement among governments with different security concerns, domestic pressures and historical relationships with Russia.

Kallas's position should therefore be assessed by what the EU's foreign policy actually requires, rather than by whether she personally approves of every diplomatic initiative. Her supporters would argue that a tougher position prevents Moscow from exploiting divisions and that negotiations without credible pressure risk becoming a mechanism for rewarding aggression. Her critics may argue that deterrence without a functioning diplomatic channel leaves Europe reacting to decisions made by Washington and Moscow. Both concerns deserve attention. The question is whether the EU can combine pressure, support for Ukraine and direct communication without allowing any one of those objectives to undermine the others.

The recent Nordic initiative also raises the question of whether Europe needs a clearly mandated diplomatic representative for negotiations concerning Ukraine. The Guardian reported on 29 October that European governments were debating the possibility of appointing a representative, while disagreement persisted over who should be selected and what authority that person would possess. Such a role would require agreement on the representative's mandate, the limits of negotiation and the relationship with Kyiv. Without those arrangements, the EU risks creating a position that carries a title but lacks the political authority to deliver anything.

The same institutional questions apply to the wider leadership of the European Union. Ursula von der Leyen, as Commission President, leads a different institution from the European Council and the EU's foreign policy service. António Costa, as European Council President, has a role in coordinating the political direction of member states. Kallas has responsibility for the Union's external diplomatic representation within her mandate. Criticism of European leadership should therefore distinguish between the responsibilities of these offices rather than treating them as interchangeable positions. The EU's problem is not simply that particular personalities are unpopular. It is that its institutional architecture can make it difficult to formulate and execute a coherent foreign policy when member states disagree.

There is also a risk in assuming that a telephone call with Putin is automatically a diplomatic breakthrough. Direct communication is a tool, not an outcome. Putin may use the call to present Russia as indispensable to European security discussions, while European leaders may use it to convey concerns or explore the possibility of negotiations. The call does not establish that Russia has accepted Ukraine's terms, that the war is approaching a settlement or that European divisions have been resolved. Putin has continued to defend Russia's position and has said Moscow remains prepared for confrontation if challenged. The existence of a conversation should not be mistaken for evidence of a change in strategic objectives.

What Europe needs is a foreign policy capable of doing two things simultaneously: maintaining support for Ukraine's sovereignty and preserving the ability to communicate directly with Russia. A government does not have to approve of another government's actions to negotiate with it. Diplomacy is often most necessary when relationships are hostile, because the alternative may be a crisis in which decisions are made without communication. Equally, engagement must not become an excuse to negotiate over Ukraine's future without Ukraine's participation. Kyiv must remain central to any process concerning its territory, security and political future.

The debate over Kallas is therefore a debate about the EU itself. If the Union wants to be taken seriously as a geopolitical actor, it must establish who speaks for it, what authority that person possesses and how national governments coordinate their diplomacy. Removing one officeholder would not automatically solve those institutional problems, just as retaining the current leadership does not guarantee that they will be resolved. Europe needs a foreign policy structure that can combine deterrence, negotiation and political coordination. The Nordic call has exposed the gap between Europe's ambitions and its diplomatic organisation. The real question is whether its leaders are prepared to address that gap before decisions about Europe's security are made entirely by others.